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Abstract
Given the very clear and limited role that states created for judicial settlement in the United
Nations Charter, a serious attempt to expand the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction would
inevitably involve an amendment of the Charter itself. In light of the hostility that all but a few
states have shown with regard to compulsory adjudication, such an effort would be doomed to
failure.
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INTRODUCTION
The creation of the International Court of Justice' (ICJ or
Court) has not effectively reduced the number or severity of
international conflicts. Our world is full of violence between
states yet the Court itself is often without a contentious case
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1. With the establishment of the United Nations and the dissolution of the Per-
manent Court ofJustice (PCIJ), the International Court ofJustice (ICJ or Court) was
created. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. The history of the Court dates back to the 1920's
when the Permanent Court of International Justice was established in the wake of
World War I. The STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Statute of the
Court) is today appended as a part of the U.N. Charter. See id. Article 93 of the U.N.
Charter makes the member states of the United Nations ipsofacto members of the ICJ.
U.N. CHARTER art. 93. The U.N. CHARTER, art. 93 provides that:
1. All Members of the United Nations are ipsofacto parties to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a
party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions
to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the rec-
ommendation of the Security Council.
Id.
The primary jurisdictional provision of the ICJ is article 36 of the Statute of the
Court. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, para. 6, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, T.I.A.S. No. 993 (1945). Article 36 generally provides that the Court has
jurisdiction to decide disputes brought before it by states in matters of international
law. Id. The issue of voluntary jurisdiction as opposed to compulsory jurisdiction
was addressed in article 36(2), which became known as the Optional Clause. Id. art.
36, para. 2. This provision attempted to reconcile the consensual nature of interna-
tional law and the desires of the states drafting the Court's Statute to reach a com-
promise concerning the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Pursuant to this provision,
the ICJ may exercise compulsory jurisdiction only over those states which have con-
sented. Id. In order to encourage states to consent to the ICJ's compulsory jurisdic-
tion under the Optional Clause, various reservations to a state's consent were permit-
ted under article 36(3) of the ICJ statute. Id. art. 36, para. 3; Merrills, The Optional
Clause Today, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 87, 88 (1979); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para.
3. These reservations to consent reflected concern that the ICJ might use its compul-
sory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause to assume jurisdiction in a manner to
which the state had not consented and thus to overstep state sovereignty.
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before it. States have historically been reluctant to submit
their interests to an international tribunal. Thus, the Court's
jurisdiction for contentious cases is narrow. Many jurisdic-
tional declarations made under article 36(2) of the Court's
Statute 2-the so-called "Optional Clause'-are severely re-
stricted by the use of broad reservations. Moreover, in recent
years, the Court has been plagued by the problem of the so-
called "non-appearing respondent." Despite their prior ac-
ceptances of both the Statute of the Court and, consequently,
the Court's power under article 36(6) to decide questions of its
own competence, states have adopted a practice of boycotting
the Court's proceedings in order to contest jurisdiction.4 By
its decision to withdraw from any further proceedings in the
case initiated by Nicaragua, the United States-commonly seen
as a supporter ofjudicial settlement-recently joined the ranks
of the non-appearing respondents. 5
2. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 36, para. 2.
3. For a history of the content and number of reservations under the Optional
Clause, see Waldock, The Decline of the Optional Clause, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 244
(1957). Merrills, The Optional Clause Today, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 87 (1979) gives a
comparable, but more recent, survey of the subject.
4. See J. ELKIND, NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUS-
TICE: A FUNCTIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1984) (exhaustive analysis of the
phenomenon of non-appearance). States have boycotted all or part of the following
cases: Corfu Channel (U.K. and N.Ire. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 244 (Judgment of Decem-
ber 15); Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.Cj. 93 (Preliminary Ob-
jection); Nottebohm Case (Leicht. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. Ill (Preliminary Objection);
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. and N.Ir. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12 (Interim Protection Or-
der of Aug. 17); Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), 1973 I.Cj. 328
(Interim Protection Order of July 13); Nuclear Tests (Austrl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253
(Judgment of Dec. 20), (N.F. v. Fr.) 1974 I.CJ. 457 (Judgment of Dec. 20); Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf (Grece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Dec. 19); Iranian
Hostages (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24, 1980).
5. The Republic of Nicaragua submitted an application to the I.Cj. on April 9,
1984 alleging that the United States was using military force against Nicaragua in
violation of international law. Nicaraguan Application to the International Court of
Justice of April 9, 1984, quoted in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 429 (Judgment of Nov. 26 on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility) [hereinafter cited as Judgment of Nov. 26]. The Nicaraguan applica-
tion stated in pertinent part that:
The United States of America is using military force against Nicaragua and
intervening in Nicaragua's internal affairs in violation of Nicaragua's sover-
eignty, territorial integrity and political independence and of the most fun-
damental and universally accepted principles of international law. The
United States has created an "army" of more than 10,000 mercenaries ...
supplied them with arms, ammunition, food and medical supplies, and di-
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Because any court can only be effective if it has cases
before it to decide, there has been much discussion about com-
pulsory jurisdiction and the need for reforms that would ex-
pand the Court's competence. 6 In light of such discussion, the
natural question is what chance such reforms have of gaining
acceptance in the international community.7 The key to an-
swering this question lies in the history and structure of inter-
national obligations governing dispute resolution. Although
the behaviour of non-appearing respondents suggests that
rected their attacks against human and economic targets inside Nicaragua
Id. at 429.
The United States had, three days before the filing of Nicaragua's application, noti-
fied the Secretary-General of the United Nations that its 1946 declaration under the
Optional Clause would not apply to disputes with any Central American state. 23
I.L.M. 670 (1984) (Secretary Shultz's letter modifying jurisdiction); Judgment of Nov.
26, 1984 I.C.J. at 396-97. The Nicaraguan application to the ICJ indicated that Nica-
ragua intended to rely on the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under article 36(2),
see supra note 1, of the Statute of the ICJ. Although it was not contested that the
United States had accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ by virtue of the United States
Declaration of Consent of 1946, the United States maintained, among other things,
that Nicaragua had not accepted the same obligation and that the United States Dec-
laration of consent had been validly modified to exclude cases brought by Central
American states. See 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 88, 88-89 (1983) (text of the United States
Declaration); Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984 I.C.J. at 558 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). The
issues raised by the United States action and discussed in the ICJ'sJudgment of Nov. 26
strike not only at the purpose and effectiveness of the ICJ but also at international
law itself, which basically relies on the good faith and cooperation of sovereign states.
See Goldie, Connally Reservation: A Shield for an Adversary, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 277, 345-
52 (1962).
In response to the Court's decision finding jurisdiction, the United States an-
nounced in January, 1985 that it would boycott further proceedings in the case. See
Secretary of State Schultz's Letter and Related Documents 24 I.L.M. 246-63 (1985).
As a result of its general displeasure with the Court's actions, the United States has
cancelled its 1946 acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause.
Id. at 1742-45.
6. A thorough discussion of reform of the Court's jurisdiction is found in Gross,
The International Court ofJustice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing Its Role in the
International Legal Order, 65 AM.J. INT'L L. 253 (1971). For an eloquent argument in
favor of compulsory jurisdiction as the centerpiece of international dispute settle-
ment, see Kelsen, Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes, 37 AM.J. INT'L L. 397
(1943). See also H. KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAw (1973) (author's idea of an interna-
tional organization headed by a court with compulsory jurisdiction).
7. Another important question is, of course, whether or not the International
Court of Justice, or any other tribunal, could actually keep the peace even if it had
compulsory jurisdiction. See Kunz, Compulsory Adjudication and the Maintenance of Peace,
38 AM. J. INT'L L. 673 (1944) (author makes a strong case against judicial settlement
based on the problem of enforcement, the deficiency of international law rules, and
the difficulty in distinguishing between political and legal questions).
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states may ignore their international obligations with regard to
judicial settlement, those obligations are still important. They
demonstrate how the international community feels in the ab-
stract about international adjudication in the broader frame-
work of dispute settlement. The obligations show that states
have not created significant commitments to the use ofjudicial
settlement and that the passage of time has not increased their
willingness to submit their disputes to an international tribu-
nal.
The main current throughout the history of dispute settle-
ment has been the quest to avoid war as a legitimate means of
resolving interstate controversies. At least in terms of legal
norms, mankind has been successful in this task. The United
Nations Charter contains the key principles. Article 2(3) re-
quires states to settle "their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered." 8 Article 2(4) then continues:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 9
Despite the wide acceptance of the principle of peaceful
settlement as expressed in the Charter, there remains an im-
portant operative issue. What means should states use to re-
solve their disputes in order that war can be avoided? The
problem is a fundamental one. The international community
cannot be content with appearances. It is not enough that
peaceful settlement is accepted on paper. In a world where
disputes can cost millions of lives, it is imperative that the prin-
ciple of peaceful settlement be given some teeth in the form of
procedures for dispute settlement.
As the narrow declarations under the Optional Clause and
the actions of the non-appearing respondents suggest, any at-
tempt to structure the procedure of dispute settlement by mak-
ing a certain method compulsory will be very difficult. More-
over, if the method promoted is to be judicial settlement, the
task of introducing compulsion may be impossible. Through-
out their discussions of ways to resolve their disputes, states
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
9. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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have almost universally rejected compulsory third party settle-
ment, be it in the form of arbitration or judicial settlement.
I. EARLY PRACTICE: THE HAGUE SYSTEM AND THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
The idea of submitting interstate disputes to a third party
for settlement is not a new one. As early as the time of the
Greek city-states, there existed a relatively well-developed sys-
tem of dispute settlement by reference to the Delphic Amphic-
tyonies. Scholars describe this process as a rudimentary form
of third party settlement based on law and customs of correct
behaviour.1t Elsewhere, the idea of third party settlement is
found in early periods of Middle Eastern history, in the sacred
codes of the Far East, and in the experience of Islam."
Grotius, the father of modern international law, wrote in
1625 with regard to arbitration:
Christian Kings and States are bound to employ this
method of avoiding war. . . And for this reason and many
other purposes, it would be helpful-as a matter of fact,
necessary-for the Christian powers to hold conferences
where those whose interests were not involved might settle
the disputes of the rest, and even take measures to compel
the parties to accept peace on fair terms.'
2
Although writing in the 1600's, Grotius had examples to cite in
support of his view. In 1176, for example, the Kings of Castile
and Navarre had concluded a treaty to submit their differences
for resolution by Henry II of England, father-in-law of the for-
mer and nephew of the latter. t 3 In addition, the Italian city-
states born during the Renaissance period adopted a practice
of referring their disputes to the Catholic Church in Rome,
which was to judge, not mediate, the differences between the
10. IV M. Taube, Les origines de l'arbitrage international: antiquite et moyen ages, 42
R.A.D.I. 1, (1932); C. PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT
GREECE AND ROME (1911).
11. S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT FUNCTIONS 11
(1973).
12. II H. GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI AC PACIS, ch. 23 sec. 8 (1625) (L. Loomis trans.
1949).
13. See G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 242 (5th ed.
1967).
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parties. 14
Modern nation states, particularly the United States and
the United Kingdom, continued this tradition. The signing of
the 1794 Jay Treaty ended the American Revolution and set up
a commission to dispose of the remaining disputes.' 5
Although the commission was composed of United States and
British nationals, not neutral judges, it applied law and court-
like procedure. 16
Within the United States itself, the idea of international
adjudication grew. In 1834 and 1844, the Massachusetts legis-
lature passed resolutions urging creation of an international
procedure for the amicable, third party settlement of disputes.
Vermont did likewise in 1852.17
In May 1871, the United States and the United Kingdom
once again chose a form of international adjudication in set-
ting up the Alabama tribunal through their signing of the Wash-
ington Treaty.' 8 During the Civil War the frigate Alabama had
been particularly successful in preying on Union shipping after
leaving British ports and joining Confederate naval forces.
The Alabama tribunal-composed of one American citizen,
one British citizen, and three neutralsl 9-applied specified
rules of international law and awarded the United States
$15,000,000 damage. 20 Not only did the British pay the sum,
but by 1888 235 members of the British Parliament sent the
United States a communication asking that a permanent arbi-
tration treaty be negotiated between the two states.2'
Thus, by the 1890's when attention became focused on
14. A. BOZEMAN, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 266-67
(1960).
15. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, United States -
Great Britain, 52 Parry's T.S. 243 (commonly known as the Jay Treaty).
16. S. ROSENNE, supra note 11, at 12-13.
17. D. FLEMING, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT 15-17 (rev. ed.
1968). In 1840, New Hampshire farmer William Ladd proposed an international
court of nations in his "Essay on a Congress of Nations." See W. LADD, ESSAYS ON
THE CONGRESS OF NATIONS (reprinted 1916).
18. Treaty for the Amicable Settlement of all Causes of Difference, May 8, 1871,
Great Britain - United States, 143 Parry's T.S. 145 (Washington Treaty).
19. D. FLEMING, supra note 17.
20. See LAPARDELLE & POLOTIS, 2 RECEUIL DES ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONALES, 713
(1923).
21. D. FLEMING, supra note 17, at 17.
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the establishment of a permanent world adjudicatory body,22
states had had some experience with third party dispute settle-
ment. That experience taught them that voluntary arbitration
was not an adequate, impartial means of settlement. 23 More-
over, arbitration had been exclusively on an ad hoc basis. States
had to choose to arbitrate and establish a tribunal each time a
dispute arose.
Given these problems, states had begun in the latter half
of the 1800's to include compromise clauses in a number of
international conventions on various subjects, e.g., the Univer-
sal Postal Convention of 1874.24 This trend continued, and
between 1899 and 1914 states entered into 125 treaties obli-
gating themselves to accept arbitration for certain types of dis-
putes .25
This flurry of activity in international dispute settlement
reached a high point with the Hague Conferences of 189926
and 1907.27 Tsar Nicholas II of Russia called the 1899 Confer-
ence to discuss the rising level of armaments possessed by the
European nations. Armaments in Europe had reached a level
that Russia was unable to match.28 At the Conference, two dif-
fering points of view emerged with respect to dispute settle-
ment.29 The first favored the establishment of a more or less
22. Patterson, The United States and the Origins of the World Court, 91 POL. ScI. Q.
279, 280-81 (1976-77).
23. Id. The New York State Bar Association issued a report in 1896 on arbitra-
tion as practiced up to that time concluding that the use of partisan arbitrators, and
the consequent lack of an impartial judge, prevented impartial decision-making. The
report called for the establishment of a new permanent tribunal.
24. M.O. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-
1942: A TREATISE 3 (1943); see Treaty between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary,
Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Servia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tur-
key, and the United States, relative to the formation of a General Postal Union, Oct.
9, 1874, 147 Parry's T.S. 136 (French text).
25. See M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 10 n.4.
26. See, e.g., International Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, July 29, 1899, 187 Parry's T.S. 410 (French text) reprinted in 2 MAJOR PEACE
TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY: 1648-1967, 1115 (F. Israel ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as First Hague Convention].
27. For the 1907 Conference, see 205 Parry's T.S. 216, 216-404 (Conventions
signed at the Hague on Oct. 18, concluding the Hague Conference of 1907; French
texts); see also 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY: 1648-1967, 1199 [here-
inafter cited as Second Hague Convention].
28. D. FLEMING, supra note 17, at 18.
29. S. ROSENNE, supra note 11, at 14.
1986] 219
220 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 9:213
standing court of arbitration that states could use as they
pleased. The second also favored the establishment of an arbi-
tral body. In addition, it proposed that states should be placed
under an obligation to arbitrate certain types of disputes.
Although third party settlement by arbitration had be-
come a popular idea, it reached the limits of its appeal when
discussion came to center on the issue of compulsion. The
vast majority of states preferred the idea of a non-compulsory
arbitration institution to that of a tribunal with compulsory ju-
risdiction.30
Even the states proposing that some obligation be in-
cluded in the First Hague Convention showed their distaste for
truly compulsory arbitration of disputes. For example, United
States Secretary of State John Hay instructed his delegation to
push for a permanent court with compulsory jurisdiction, but
at the same time to make sure that disputes affecting political
independence or territorial integrity be excluded from arbitra-
tion. Only the imagination can define the boundaries that
such a reservation to jurisdiction might have had.
The 1899 Conference produced the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. This court was not really an institutional body at
all. Instead, it was a list of seventy-five to one hundred names
from which states could select arbitrators if and when they de-
cided to arbitrate a dispute.32 The decision to arbitrate was
purely voluntary, and states were still free to choose their own
nationals as arbitrators.33 While there were as many as fifty
arbitrations handled outside the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion between 1902 and 1914, states employed the mechanism
itself only 14 times during the same period.34
Although the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 had made it
clear that the mere existence of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
30. Id. For a full report on the Hague Conferences, see J.B. Scorr, THE RE-
PORTS TO TIE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 (1917). As Tuchman has
noted in her description of the 1899 Conference and the Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of Disputes it produced, "[d]elegates [who] worked mightily to draw up a
convention of sixty one Articles, while applying 'a zeal almost macabre' to removing
any trace of compulsory character." B. TUCHMAN, THE PROUD TOWER 266 (1966).
31. J.B. ScoTr, INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATION TO THE HAGUE
CONFERENCES AND THEIR OFFICIAL REPORTS 9 (1916).
32. Patterson, supra note 22, at 281; D. FLEMING, supra note 17, at 18.
33. Patterson, supra note 22, at 281.
34. M.O. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, PAST AND FUTURE 7 (1944).
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tration could not keep the peace, 5 the system created by the
1899 Conference was changed little at the 1907 meeting. In
1907, the United States did propose a permanent judicial insti-
tution with a full-time staff.36 Though they recognized that use
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration was "difficult, time-con-
suming, and expensive to set in motion, ' 3 7 most states found
the idea of creating a real, standing tribunal to be too radical.3
Moreover, the idea was rejected due to the insistence of the
powerful states sponsoring it that they have numerical superi-
ority in judges.
Recognizing, however, that something had to be done to
strengthen the dispute settlement system, states seemed ready
to accept an obligation to arbitrate at least certain legal dis-
putes. No state, on the other hand, was prepared for truly
compulsory arbitration and a large exception to jurisdiction
had to be made.3 9 Thus, the language of the First Hague Con-
vention exempting from arbitration disputes "involving vital
interests, independence, and honor" remained in the Second
Hague Convention.4 ° The effort to oblige states to arbitrate
certain disputes was left to an optional protocol which re-
quired arbitration with regard to pecuniary claims and ques-
tions under international conventions covering seven stated
categories of matters.4 1
The obligations resulting from the two Hague Conven-
tions were, in reality, nothing revolutionary for their time.
Hudson has stated that they only confirmed the existing law of
pacific settlement that states had theretofore been practicing.4 2
Article 1 of the Second Hague Convention required states to
"use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement of inter-
national differences. ' 4 3 It then recommended that states use
Good Offices and Mediation44 and Commissions of Inquiry45
35. D. FLEMING, supra note 17, at 19.
36. D.J. HILL, THE PROBLEM OF A WORLD COURT 10-14 (1927).
37. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 80.
38. Patterson, supra note 22, at 283.
39. Waldock, supra note 3, at 256.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see also 2 Actes et documents 136 (1907).
42. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 5.
43. 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 1199.
44. See id. arts. 2-8 (Part II of the Second Hague Convention).
45. See id. arts. 9-38.
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"as far as circumstances allow." Despite these recommenda-
tions, states used such methods very sparingly. For example,
although elaborate rules were set down for inquiry, states con-
tinued their practice of making only sparing use of this method
of settlement. It was used under the Second Hague Conven-
tion only three times in forty years.46
Article 38 of the Second Hague Convention stated that ar-
bitration of legal questions, especially those arising under in-
ternational accords, was the most effective and equitable
means of settlement. As to an actual obligation to arbitrate,
however, article 38 provided little. It said only that "it would
be desirable that, in disputes about the above-mentioned ques-
tions, the Contracting Powers should, if the case arose, have re-
course to arbitration, in so far as circumstances permit.' '4 7 Article
53 created somewhat of an illusion of compulsory jurisdiction
by specifying, on the one hand, that the Permanent Court of
Arbitration could be invoked by unilateral application. On the
other hand, the same article concluded that "[r]ecourse cannot
• . . be had to the Court if the other party declares that in its
opinion the dispute does not belong to the category of dis-
putes which can be submitted to compulsory arbitra-
tion. .. . Hudson reports that the severely limited power
of unilateral application under article 53 was never successfully
exercised. 49 In essence, taken as a whole, the Hague Conven-
tions were not even agreements to arbitrate. 0 Instead, they
featured other methods of dispute settlement, left to states the
power to choose a means of settlement, and failed to provide
truly compulsory arbitration for any disputes.
At the 1907 Conference, two draft conventions were also
discussed and ratified-one for the creation of a Court of Arbi-
tral Justice5 and the other for an International Prize Court. 2
46. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 37. The incidents were the North Sea Incident
(U.K. & Russia) (1904), The Tavignano, Cammouna, and Gaulois (Italy & France) (1912),
and the Tabautia Inquiry (Germany & The Netherlands) (1922). Id.
47. See Second Hague Convention, 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at
1206 (art. 38) (emphasis added).
48. Id., 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 124 (art. 53).
49. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 34, at 11.
50. Id.
51. 1 Actes et documents 702 (1907).
52. Convention for the Establishment of an International Prize Court, Oct. 18,
1907, 205 Parry's T.S. 381 (French text); see also 1 Actes et documents 668 (1907).
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Although subsequent discussions took place, both of these ini-
tiatives were doomed to failure. The major powers could not
agree on the law to be applied in the Prize Court, and no na-
tion ever ratified its convention. With the demise of the Prize
Court, the political prospects for the Court of Arbitral Justice
worsened, and it was never created.53
Outside Europe, the Central American republics also
made some attempts at establishing a functioning means of
third party settlement. For instance, the 1902 Treaty of
Corinto54 provided for the obligatory arbitration of differences
by a permanent tribunal. Although the tribunal was estab-
lished, it never rendered an opinion and was considered non-
existent by 1907. 55 Later, at the Central American Peace Con-
ference of Washington in 1907, the Central American states
signed a General Treaty of Peace and Amity5 6 as well as a Con-
vention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of
Justice.57 Although article 1 of the General Treaty required
the states to "decide every difference .. .amongst them, of
whatsoever nature it may be, by means of the Central Ameri-
can Court of Justice,"'5 8 article 1 of the court's convention-
which required states to use diplomatic means before the court
could take jurisdiction-narrowed this broad grant of jurisdic-
tion.
The Central American Court ofJustice heard ten cases be-
tween 1908 and 1918. It intervened on its own motion in a
number of circumstances reminding parties of their obligation
to settle disputes peacefully and offering to mediate. 59 The
Court expired ten years after its creation, as per the terms of
its convention. The states involved met and drafted a new con-
53. Patterson, supra note 22, at 284-86: Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribu-
nals with Regionally Restricted and/or Specialized Jurisdiction, in JUDICIAL SET-rLEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 313 (1974).
54. Convention of Peace and Arbitration, Jan. 20, 1902, 190 Parry's T.S. 357
(Treaty of Corinto).
55. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 42-43.
56. General Treaty of Peace and Amity and Additional Convention, Dec. 20,
1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 63 (Spanish text), 206 Parry's T.S. 72 (English translation).
57. Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice,
Dec. 20, 1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 79 (Spanish text), 206 Parry's T.S. 90 (English trans-
lation); 2 AM.J. INT'L L. 231-65 (Supp. 1908).
58. General Treaty of Peace and Amity and Addition Convention, Dec. 20,
1907, 206 Parry's T.S. 72, 73.
59. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 52-53.
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vention in 1923.60 This time, however, they limited the tribu-
nal's jurisdiction by exempting disputes affecting sovereignty
and the independent existence of states. The convention came
into force, but a new court was never organized.6'
The coming of World War I in Europe created great de-
pression among international scholars. 62 So many interna-
tional norms and aspirations, including the Hague Conven-
tions on peaceful settlement, were disregarded by states that
the American Society of International Law passed a resolution
stating, with regard to the war, "the very existence of interna-
tional law is now at issue."163 The conflict caused scholars like
Lord James Bryce 64 in Great Britain and Elihu Root 65 in the
United States to work for the establishment of an international
system featuring a court with some measure of obligatory juris-
diction.
The League of Nations system which followed the War did
little to live up to these expectations. It focused on the polit-
ical rather than judicial settlement of disputes. Once again,
there was to be no compulsory submission of differences to an
international adjudicatory tribunal. Instead, emphasizing
political settlement, article 11(2) of the League Covenant gave
each state a "friendly right" to bring to the attention of the
Council or Assembly any problem which threatened interna-
66tional peace.
Article 12 required that "dispute[s] likely to lead to a rup-
ture" be submitted either to arbitration, judicial settlement, or
inquiry by the Council. States further agreed to resort to war
only three months after a decision rendered by one of these
processes. Thus, states retained the ultimate power to choose,
on whatever basis they wished, what form of dispute resolution
to use.
Article 13 went into more detail on adjudication. First,
60. Id. at 66-67.
61. Id. at 68.
62. Patterson, supra note 22, at 286.
63. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council, April 27, 1918, 1918 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 14.
64. Patterson, supra note 22, at 287. Lord Bryce worked principally on defining
legal and political questions for use in determining an international court's jurisdic-
tion. Id.
65. 2 P. JEssUP, ELIHU ROOT 315-19 (1938).
66. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 11, para. 2.
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paragraph 1 specified that disputes which state's "recognize" as
suitable for arbitration and judicial settlement-and which are
not settled diplomatically-be referred to arbitration or judi-
cial settlement. 67 Furthermore, it stated that treaty interpreta-
tion, factual questions, and reparations were considered "gen-
erally suitable for submission to arbitration" or judicial settle-
ment.68 Lastly, paragraph 3 required that such disputes be
referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice or
"the Court agreed on by the parties. ' 69 While article 13 seems
to provide for some mandatory adjudication, in reality, it left
states free to select tribunals other than the Permanent Court,
including arbitral bodies, to submit only the disputes in para-
graph 2 to adjudication, and to avoid adjudication altogether
through the use of diplomatic settlement.
Article 15 underlined the ultimate political nature of set-
tlement in the Covenant. 70 It stated that any dispute not sub-
mitted to arbitration or judicial settlement under article 13 was
to be decided by the Council. The Council, a political institu-
tion, was therefore the one body to which states could always
appeal. In fact, the League Covenant did not even create a
judicial body. Article 14 said only:
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of
the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall
be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an in-
ternational character which the parties thereto submit to it.
The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dis-
pute or question referred to it by the Council or by the As-
sembly. 7'
Even this mention of a court was absent in Woodrow Wil-
son's draft of the Covenant. He strongly resisted any sugges-
tion of a court and refused even to appoint any supporter of
the idea to the Paris Peace Conference delegation, with the ex-
ception of his Secretary of State who had to attend. 72 The Brit-
67. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 13.
68. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 13, para. 2.
69. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 13, para. 3.
70. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 15.
71. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 14.
72. Patterson, supra note 22, at 290.
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ish draft similarly contained no reference to a court.73
Although the French, Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes placed a
court in their drafts,7 4 they made no attempt to secure compul-
sory submission of disputes to an international tribunal.75
Article 14 of the Covenant, as seen above, clearly refers to
court jurisdiction with regard to "dispute[s] of an international
character which the parties thereto submit to it.' '7 6 Lord Robert
Cecil had proposed that article 14 give the Permanent Court
jurisdiction over "any dispute or difference of an international
character. ' 77 However, since such wording was considered to
point toward obligatory use of the Permanent Court, the
League of Nations Commission omitted it from the text of arti-
cle 14.78
In 1920, the Council exercised its duties under article 14
and invited jurists from ten nations to draft the Permanent
Court Statute, which states would be free to accept or reject.79
The Statute was not to be an integral part of the League Cove-
nant. Two major problems faced this 1920 Advisory Commit-
tee: the election of judges and the jurisdiction of the new
court. The first was solved by the existence of the League it-
self. To please both small and large states, it was decided that
the Council and Assembly would jointly elect the judges.8 0
The jurisdictional issue was more difficult. The majority
of the Advisory Committee favored conferring compulsory ju-
risdiction on the Permanent Court.8" A minority, pointing to
the wording of article 14 of the Covenant, felt that jurisdiction
must be based purely on consent.82 Elihu Root of the United
States warned that unless compulsory jurisdiction was limited
to certain areas, states would not accept the Statute.83 The ma-
73. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 93-94.
74. Id. at 94.
75. Id. at 94-95.
76. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 14.
77. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 106.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 114-15. Japan, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Belgium, France, United States,
Norway, Netherlands, and Great Britain were represented. Id. at 114. The Commit-
tee met 35 times between June 16 and July 24, 1920.
80. D. FLEMING, supra note 17, at 37.
81. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 190.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 190-91.
COMPULSORY ADJUDICATION
jority carried the day and the Advisory Committee draft gave
the Permanent Court obligatory jurisdiction over the disputes
listed in article 13 of the Covenant, that is, disputes over treaty
interpretation, facts, and reparations.8 4 Such a decision was
not totally revolutionary. States had at least recognized these
subjects as suitable for adjudication through their arbitral
practice and the Hague Conventions. 5
Revolutionary or not, the decision to confer some mea-
sure of obligatory jurisdiction met tremendous resistance from
the Great Powers in the Council. Italy noted, for example, that
only small countries would tolerate being taken before a court
without their consent.8 6 Great Britain and Japan opposed the
Committee recommendation on the basis of the consensual na-
ture of article 14 of the Covenant. 87 Behind the leadership of
Great Britain, the Council voted a series of amendments to
eliminate compulsory jurisdiction in the Committee propo-
sal.88
Smaller countries objected in the Assembly. Supported by
Brazil, Panama, and Portugal, Argentina argued that without
compulsory jurisdiction the Permanent Court would be noth-
ing more than an arbitral tribunal.8 9 However, an Assembly
sub-committee saw the uselessness of pushing for compulsory
jurisdiction in the face of the opposition of the larger powers
and finally decided to approve the Council amendments.9 0 Mr.
Fernandes of Brazil ultimately resolved the conflict by sug-
gesting that alternate texts be offered. States would then be
able to adhere to the jurisdictional clause that they liked best.9'
As a result of his suggestion, the Council drafted the Optional
Clause to allow states to accept jurisdiction,9 2 if they so de-
84. Id. at 191.
85. See id. at 456-57.
86. Minutes of the Council of the League of Nations (8th Session) [1920]
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., 33 (1920).
87. J. ELKIND, supra note 4, at 87.
88. Minutes of the Council of the League of Nations (10th Session) [1920]
League of Nations O.J., 161 (1920) (Annex 118).
89. M.O. HUDSON, supra note 24, at 192.
90. I Records of the First Assembly of the League of Nations: Meetings of the
Committees (Committee III) [1920] 533-34 (Annex 7: Report to the Third Commit-
tee by Mr. Hagerup on behalf of the Sub-Committee).
91. Id.
92. League of Nations Council/Minutes of Sessions 9-11 (11 th Session) [1920]
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sired, as well as to allow them to make reservations to limit
their acceptance of the Court's competence.
After the creation of the League of Nations and the Per-
manent Court, the League Assembly in 1924 drafted a proto-
col for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.93 The
object was to make more attractive the possibility of declara-
tions under the Optional Clause while at the same time pre-
serving for states "the reservations which they regard as indis-
pensable."'9 4 The Ninth Assembly continued this work and the
emphasis on the use of reservations to reduce the scope ofju-
risdiction under the Optional Clause. 95 The result was the
Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of
192896 which provided for Permanent Court jurisdiction in
certain disputes, but only after conciliation and negotiation
had failed to resolve a problem. No case was ever brought
before the Permanent Court on the basis of the General Act.
Also during this period, states drafted and signed the fa-
mous Kellogg-Briand Pact in Paris. 97 This 1929 treaty was the
first to prohibit generally the making of aggressive war. Article
2 of the Pact stated the agreement of the parties that "settle-
ment . . . of all disputes or conflicts of whatever . . . origin
they may be . . . shall never be sought except by pacific
means."98 The Pact failed, however, to confer any jurisdiction
on the Permanent Court or to specify any obligations as to the
type of dispute resolution states were supposed to use.99
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
States were not strangers to the idea of adjudication or
93. League of Nations Doc. C.606. M.211.1924 IV, (1924), reprinted in 2 M.O.
HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1378 (1932).
94. Records of the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations (27th Plenary Mtg.
Oct. 1, 1924) Spec. Supp. No. 23 at 225.
95. Records of the Ninth Assembly of the League of Nations (19th Plenary Mtg.
Sept, 26, 1928) 183, Spec. Supp. No. 64.
96. General Act (Pacific Settlement of International Disputes), Sept. 26, 1928,
93 L.N.T.S. 343.
97. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 59.
98. Id. art. 2.
99. Kelsen saw the failure to endow a court with compulsory jurisdiction as the
fatal flaw in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. H. KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 18 (1944).
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judicial settlement when they sat down to decide upon a post-
World War Two international organization. Apart from the
tradition of ad hoc arbitrations and the Hague Conventions,
states had seen the creation of the Permanent Court under the
League of Nations system. What they had not experienced, on
the other hand, was any true limitation on their ability to
choose between methods of dispute settlement.
Like arbitration under the Hague Conventions, judicial
settlement under the League of Nations framework had been
purely optional. States were not bound to accept the Perma-
nent Court's Statute. If they did accept it, they were by no
means obliged to make declarations under the Optional Clause
or bring cases before the Permanent Court for resolution.
The United Nations Charter changed this status ofjudicial
settlement in only one significant way. Under article 92, the
International Court of Justice is an organ of the United Na-
tions and is therefore part of the international organization it-
self.'0 0 This change means that a state ratifying the Charter
automatically accepts the jurisdiction of the Court in three lim-
ited ways. The Statute gives the Court jurisdiction with regard
to decisions concerning interim measures, intervention, and
competence in a particular case.' 0 ' However, states are in real-
ity subject to very few jurisdictional constraints merely by vir-
tue of their acceptance of the Court's Statute. They are still
totally free to refrain from making declarations under the Op-
tional Clause and to ignore the Court as a means of dispute
settlement.
The Charter does not encourage international adjudica-
tion. Instead, it continues the focus on political settlement and
the Court is routinely by-passed in favor of the Security Coun-
cil and the General Assembly.1
0 2
100. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
101. Article 41 of the Statute gives the Court power to order interim measures.
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 41. The power to decide ques-
tions ofjurisdiction lies in article 36(6). The Court can order intervention by virtue
of its power in article 61.
102. Steinberger, The International Court of Justice, in MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUDICIAL SETrLEMENT: AN INTER-
NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 207 (1974); Kearney, Amid the Encircling Gloom, in 1 THE FUTURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 108 (L. Gross ed. 1976); D.W. GRIEG, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 693 (1976). As Grieg has concluded:
The Charter is perhaps more of a discouragement than an incentive to judi-
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To be sure, the Charter requires states to settle their dis-
putes "by peaceful means, and in conformity with the princi-
ples ofjustice and international law . . . .,103 In addition, ar-
ticle 2(3) reiterates the duty of peaceful settlement and article
2(4) places a ban on the use of force. The Charter does not,
however, give the Court a major role in relation to these provi-
sions.
Article 24 confers "primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security" upon the Security
Council, not the Court. In addition, article 33(1) gives states
an absolutely free hand in deciding how to resolve their con-
troversies.1 04
Although it is clear that states must choose some form of
peaceful dispute settlement, the framers of the Charter-fol-
lowing the tradition they had before them-thought it wise to
gives states as wide a choice as possible among methods in-
cluding negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitra-
tion, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or ar-
rangements, or other peaceful means.1 5
Where the Charter does express some preference for a
particular method of settlement, that method is political. Ex-
pressing confidence in political resolution of disputes, article
37(1) requires that a failure to reach a solution by one or all of
the means listed in article 33 results in an obligation to refer
the dispute to the Security Council.106 In addition, even
before negotiations or mediation fail, any state, whether a
cial settlement. The dispute machinery of the Charter provides a new arena
for diplomatic exchanges and the advancement of legal arguments without
fear of a final determination upon their validity.
Id.
103. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
104. U.N. CHARTER art. 33 para. 1. This article states:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
...international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
of their own choice.
Id.
105. 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 895-96 (1971); see U.N.
CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
106. Stienberger, supra note 102, at 204; Gross, The International Court of Justice:
Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the International Legal Order, in I THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 29-30 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
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member of the United Nations or not, is permitted access to
the Security Council for dispute resolution under article 35.
Thus, it is the Security Council, not the International Court of
Justice, which has the truly compulsory competence to address
disputes in the United Nations system.
The Charter's only hint at a specific role for judicial settle-
ment can be found in article 36. In recommending "appropri-
ate procedures or methods of adjustment," the Security Coun-
cil under article 36(3) "should also take into consideration that
legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to
the International Court of Justice . ",.07 The very lan-
guage of article 36(3) does not give judicial settlement a very
large role. The Security Council is not empowered to refer a
dispute to the Court. Instead, it can only recommend that the
parties themselves refer the dispute to judicial settlement.
Such a recommendation is not binding on the states in-
volved.' 0 8 Moreover, nothing in article 36 requires the Secur-
ity Council to make such recommendations in the first place.
As Monaco has noted in describing the Court's minor role
in the Charter, article 95 makes clear that states are perfectly
free to use tribunals other than the International Court ofJus-
tice.' 0 9 Once again, the Court can be by-passed. In addition,
decisions issued by the Court are limited in their effect. By the
terms of article 94, the Court's decisions are binding only
upon the parties in the particular case.
Although states at the San Francisco Conference chose to
give judicial settlement this relatively minor role in the frame-
work of the Charter, the ultimate size of that role-that is, the
Court's effectiveness in its assigned part-was dependent upon
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 3 (emphasis added).
108. After the Security Council recommended they submit to the ICJ their dis-
pute over the sweeping of mines in the North Corfu Channel, Great Britain and Alba-
nia executed a compromis to confer jurisdiction on the Court. See 1949 I.CJ. at 310.
The Security Council action under article 36 is a "recommendation." Article 25 re-
quires states to carry out the "decisions, not "recommendations", of the Security
Council. Because article 36 originally appeared without paragraph three, the United
States proposed the language quoted in the text here to make clear that the Security
Council action would not be binding. See 12 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 105, at 1286-
87 (1971). In the Corfu Channel case, seven judges signed a joint opinion which held
that recommendations under article 36 do not create a new class of of compulsory
jurisdiction for the Court. See 1947-1948 I.C.J. 15, 20-22.
109. See U.N. CHARTER art. 95; R. MONACO, MANUALE Di DIRITTO INTERNAZION-
ALE PUBBLICO 603 (1971).
19861 231
232 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 9:213
the scope of the tribunal's jurisdiction. In drafting the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, states were once again
confronted with the question ofjurisdiction. In response, they
chose the Optional Clause.
With an eye toward post war organization, the Committee
on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
which was composed of experts of all Allied Powers except the
United States, concluded in 1944 that it would "be premature
to attempt to impose compulsory jurisdiction by means of the
Statute itself.""' Thereafter, a Committee of Jurists met in
Washington in April 1945. Forty-four governments were rep-
resented. At least twenty were in favor of compulsory jurisdic-
tion. I "
The Committee ofJurists ultimately decided to submit two
drafts to the San Francisco Conference." 2 The first repeated
the Optional Clause from article 36 of the PCIJ Statute, while
the second called for compulsory jurisdiction over disputes be-
tween the member states of the international organization.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union opposed compul-
sory jurisdiction and favored keeping submission to the Court
a purely voluntary act." 3
Debate at the San Francisco Conference focused on the
Optional Clause just as it had in 1920 during discussions of the
Permanent Court's jurisdiction. Once again, the stronger
110. Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, Feb. 10, 1944, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 (Supp. 1945).
111. Preuss, The International Court of Justice and the Problem of Compulsory Jurisdic-
tion, 13 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 471, 474 (Sept. 30, 1945).
112. Doc. Jurist 61 (rev.), G/49, 14 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 667-68 (1945).
113. Preuss, supra note 11, at 474-75. The Rapporteur of the Committee
summed up the debate and the jurists' decision as follows:
it does not seem doubtful that the majority of the Committee was in favor of
compulsory jurisdiction, but it has been noted that, in spite of this predomi-
nant sentiment, it did not seem certain, nor even probable, that all the na-
tions whose participation in the proposed International Organization ap-
pears to be necessary, were now in a position to accept the rule of compul-
sory jurisdiction, and that the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals did not seem to
affirm it; some, while retaining their preferences in this respect, thought that
the counsel of prudence was not to go beyond the procedure of the optional
clause inserted in Article 36, which has opened the way to the progressive
adoption, in less than 10 years, of compulsory jurisdiction by many States
which in 1920 refused to subscribe to it. Placed on this basis, the problem
was found to assume a political character, and the Committee thought that it
should defer it to the San Francisco Conference.
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powers opposed any form of obligatory settlement. In Com-
mittee IV/1 of the Conference, the United States and the So-
viet Union made clear their opposition to compulsory jurisdic-
tion.'t 4 Mexico, arguing for the smaller powers, expressed its
dissatisfaction. It argued that the smaller countries were re-
quired to accept large power dominance of political settlement
in the Security Council, but those same large powers would
not accept the concept of legal, impartial settlement by the
Court." '5 A sub-committee thereafter appointed to study the
issue concluded that "everything being taken into account, the
system of optional jurisdiction at the present time would be
more likely to secure general agreement.""' 6 Committee IV/i
finally approved retaining the Optional Clause by a thirty-one
to fourteen vote, although the Rapporteur noted that the ma-
jority favored compulsory jurisdiction and that several affirma-
tive votes were made only for the sake of agreement and did
not indicate states' views of the issue.' 7
The Soviet Union's position at San Francisco was quite
consistent with positions it had taken in the past. It had firmly
rejected the Permanent Court's role twenty years earlier. The
United States seems to have been worried about political
repercussions over the United Nations Charter at home. 1 8
Krylov, a Soviet delegate at the Conference and later a judge
of the Court, has written that the USSR was guided by the ne-
cessity of defending socialism, and the United States by fear of
the United States Senate." 9
Lissitzyn has concluded that the Soviet Union saw the
Court as a possible forum for challenging Marxism with capi-
talist judges and traditional international law. 120 To the Sovi-
ets, there was no impartial third world to adjudicate a dispute.
114. Doc. 661, IV/1/50, 14 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. (Committee IV/1) 226 (1945);
Preuss, supra note 111, at 475.
115. Doc. 661, IV/1/50, 14 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. (Committee IV/1) 227 (1945).
116. Doc. 702, IV/1/55, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. (Subcommittee B/IV/I) 558
(1945).
117. Id. at 391-92.
118. Wilcox, The United States Accepts Compulsoty Jurisdiction, 40 AM.J. INT'L L. 699,
699 (1946).
119. 1 Krylov, Materialy K Istorii Organizatsii Ob'Edinenmybh Natsii 212
(1949).
120. See 0. LISSITZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS ROLE IN THE
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 63 (1951).
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Litvinov is reported to have commented that in a world domi-
nated by the United States, "only an angel could be unbiased
in judging Russian affairs."' 121
Hudson once said that this Soviet fear of the Court pro-
vided the Soviet Union with a "far more substantial" reason
for opposing compulsory jurisdiction than the United States
had.12 2 Undeniably, the fear of trouble in the United States
Senate must have been on the minds of the United States dele-
gates. Only twenty years had passed since the League of Na-
tions fiasco. But Hudson, commenting on this fear, rightly
points out that the United States Senate wanted the United
States to be able to consent to the Court's jurisdiction in each
case. 123 What the United States Senate wanted was, in essence,
the antithesis of obligatory judicial settlement. Indeed, the se-
ries of crippling reservations that the United States Senate at-
tached to the United States acceptance of the Optional
Clause-including the Connally amendment and the multilat-
eral treaty reservation-shows that the United States Senate's
hostility was simply a distaste for international adjudication. 24
John Foster Dulles, in proposing sweeping reservations to the
United States acceptance, cited a lack of confidence in the
Court as an institution, the underdeveloped nature of interna-
tional law, and the desire to avoid settling political questions
by reference to the Court. 125
The lack of emphasis on judicial settlement in the Charter
and the failure to confer compulsory jurisdiction on the Court
have prompted Gross 126 and Kearney 127 to talk of a "retrogres-
121. T. A. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 296 (1935).
122. Hudson, Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 18 (1946).
123. See id.
124. The Connally Amendment removes from the Court's jurisdiction disputes
which the United States considers within its jurisdiction. The multilateral treaty
amendment requires all parties to a treaty which serves as the source ofjurisdiction
in a case to be parties in the case if they will be affected by the outcome. See generally
D. FLEMING, supra note 18 (full description of the United States Senate's opposition
to the Optional Clause and the Court throughout history). For a summary of the
legislative background of the Senate's amendments, see M. WHITEMAN, supra note
105, at 1297-1305.
125. Compulsory Jurisdiction, The International Court of Justice, Hearings on S.R. 196
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-45 (1946).
126, Gross, supra note 106, at 80.
127. Kearney, supra note 102, at 105.
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sion" in the framework of peaceful dispute resolution. How-
ever, these appraisals seem a bit too drastic because they imply
that before the advent of the United Nations system there ex-
isted more binding obligations with regard to peaceful settle-
ment and adjudication. The research conducted here has been
unable to find any such obligations. In reality, the United Na-
tions experience has been a continuation of the emphasis on
political settlement and the avoidance of obligatory adjudica-
tion. These trends were already established in the Hague Con-
ventions and the League of Nations Covenant. States are now,
as they were in the past, free to choose the means of settlement
which suit them best. Large states in 1945 successfully op-
posed compulsory jurisdiction for the world's major judicial
organ, just as they had done in 1920. The International Court
ofJustice, like the Permanent Court before it, operates under a
scheme which permits states to reject wholly, or accept subject
to reservations, its jurisdiction. Therefore, while the Charter
does not represent a leap forward in international adjudica-
tion, it does nothing to weaken the already precarious position
ofjudicial settlement in international relations. If there is "ret-
rogression" it is only in the sense that progress toward more
binding dispute settlement was not made in drafting the Char-
ter.
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
Under the United Nations system described above, few
states refer disputes to the International Court of Justice for
resolution. In terms of practice, there is certainly no custom of
executing a compromis when a dispute arises. In fact, there has
actually been a decline in the use of special agreements for ju-
risdiction. While the Permanent Court adjudicated eleven
cases by compromis in twenty years, the present Court has had
only seven such cases in the last forty years. 128
Moreover, although there are currently 244 bilateral and
multilateral treaties which confer some measure ofjurisdiction
on the Court, 129 relatively few cases have been brought using
these treaties as a source of jurisdiction. 0 The vast majority
128. 16 P.C.I.J. Ann. R., ser. E. No. 16, at 2; 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 45 (1984).
129. 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 92-108 (1984).
130. Since 1970, for example, applicants have commenced only four cases in
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of these treaties are subject matter specific, e.g. the Constitu-
tion of the International Rice Commission of 1961.'~' Juris-
diction exists under these treaties only with regard to contro-
versies related to the particular subject matter involved. This
limited scope of jurisdiction may explain the few cases which
have been brought under these agreements. It is interesting to
note that when the United States in the Iranian Hostages case
and Nicaragua in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Ac-
tivities In and Against Nicaragua tried to raise treaties of friend-
ship as bases ofjurisdiction, the respondents involved objected
to the use of those treaties in such a way. 132
A. The Quantity and Quality of Declarations Under
the Optional Clause
The practice under the Optional Clause has confirmed the
fact that relatively few states are inclined to use the Court. In
1938, forty of the fifty-two member states of the League of Na-
tions had declarations under the Optional Clause of the Per-
manent Court. 33 In 1947, the number of states with declara-
tions under the new Statute had decreased to twenty-five.
134
Five years later, in 1952-1953 when sixty nations belonged to
the United Nations, the number of declarations had increased
only to thirty-six.' 35
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, membership in
the United Nations blossomed to 110 states. By 1962-1963,
however, only thirty-seven nations, including Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, and San Marino which are not United Nations
members, had Optional Clause acceptances. 136 Ten years
which treaties have been cited forjurisdiction: Nuclear Tests (General Act), Pakistani
Prisoners of War (Genocide Convention), Iranian Hostages (Treaty of Friendship
and Operational Protocol to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations and
Consular Relations), and the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nica-
ragua (Treaty of Friendship).
131. Amended Constitution of the International Rice Commission, Nov. 23,
1961, 13 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 5204, 418 U.N.T.S. 334.
132. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24, 1980); Military and Paramilitary Activities In And
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26 on Jurisdic-
tion and Admissibility).
133. Kearney, supra note 103, at 160.
134. 1946-47 ANNUAIRE COUR INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE 105-06 (1947).
135. See 1952-1953 I.C.J.Y.B. 31 (1953).
136. 1962-1963 I.C.J.Y.B. 17-19 (1963).
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later, in 1973, 132 states belonged to the United Nations but
the acceptances of the Court's jurisdiction totalled only forty-
six.' 37 Thus, while over eighty percent of the member states of
the League of Nations had declarations in 1938, only about
thirty-five percent of United Nations members had Optional
Clause acceptances in 1973. In the past decade or so, the
trend has remained much the same. In 1983-1984, the last
year for which data is available, only forty-four out of 157
United Nations member states, about twenty-one percent, had
declarations of acceptance.13 8
The make-up of the forty-seven declarants, the forty-four
United Nations members plus Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and
San Marino, gives some idea of which of the world's blocs ac-
cept jurisdiction-if only partially-and which have rejected it
totally. There are eighteen states which are commonly consid-
ered among the Western or Developed World. 139 The Third
World is represented by twenty-nine states. 140 Cambodia is
the only communist nation to have an acceptance, which dates
from its non-communist period, before 1957. Absent from the
rolls of Optional Clause states are all Communist countries,
excluding Cambodia, and other important nations such as
France, Argentina, Brazil, and Italy. Of the Security Council's
members, only Great Britain now has a declaration. Thus,
there is not a system ofjurisdiction under the Optional Clause
which includes even a majority of the most powerful states of
the world. Moreover, since 1951, key states such as Brazil,
China, France, Iran, South Africa, Turkey, and most recently,
the United States have actually cancelled their acceptances or
allowed them to lapse without renewal.
These statistics and the absence of powerful states tell
only part of the story. The quality or scope of the jurisdiction
which exists by virtue of the declarations that are made is se-
137. 1972-1973 I.C.J.Y.B. 33 (1973).
138. 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 57-91 (1984).
139. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Israel,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. The United States has cancelled its
optional clause acceptance. See supra note 5.
140. Barbados, Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cambodia, Dominican Repub-
lic, Egypt, El Salvador, Gambia, Haiti, Honduras, India, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi,
Malta, Marutitius, Mexico, Nicragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Somalia,
Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Uruguay.
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verely hampered by reservations and conditions. For example,
of the forty-seven acceptances of the Optional Clause twenty-
five are terminable immediately upon notice.' 4 1 Six states have
included multilateral treaty reservations similar to that which
the United States raised in its case with Nicaragua. 42 Seven
states exclude any case brought by a state with a declaration
made less than one year before the filing of the application.143
In addition, nineteen states exclude matters considered within
their domestic jurisdiction from the Court's competence. 44
Among these nineteen declarations, there are five Connally-
type reservations with regard to domestic jurisdiction. 145 Fi-
nally, nine British Commonwealth nations include reservations
prohibiting the bringing of cases against one another. 146
Apart from the common types of reservations and condi-
tions shared by declarations, there has been no hesitation for
states to draft their acceptances with particular exceptions.
For instance, Barbados, New Zealand, El Salvador, Canada,
and the Philippines exclude different issues relating to sea con-
servation, pollution, and territorial limits. 147 Egypt confers ju-
risdiction only with regard to matters concerning its operation
of the Suez Canal.'4 8 El Salvador excludes questions arising
out of armed hostilities; 49 Malawi similarly reserves questions
relating to "belligerent or military occupation."' 50 Israel lim-
141. These 25 declarations are either terminable at will upon notice or can be
amended or modified in anyway if so desired by their makers. Australia, Austria,
Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Costa Rica, Kahnpuchea, El Salvador, India,
Israel, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Philippines, Portugal,
Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, and United Kingdom.
142. States having multilateral treaty reservations in their Optional Clause dec-
larations: El Salvador, India, Malta, Pakistan, Philippines, and United States (declara-
tion has been cancelled).
143. India, Malta, Philippines, United Kingdom, Mauritius, New Zealand,
Somalia.
144. Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Cambodia, El Salvador, Gambia, India,
Israel, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malta, Maritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan,
Swaziland, United States (declaration has been cancelled).
145. Malawi, Mexico, Philippines, Sudan, United States (declaration has been
cancelled).
146. Australia, Barbados, Canada, Gambia, India, Kenya, Malta, Maritius,
United Kingdom.
147. See 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 57-91 (1984).
148. Id. at 64.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 75.
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its her declaration by excluding cases brought by states which
do not recognize her, cases concerning matters between 15
May 1948 and 20 July 1949, and any case concerning armed
hostilities.151 India's declaration purporting to accept jurisdic-
tion for all disputes actually excludes matters of self-defense,
cases brought by a party with a declaration less than one year
old, cases commenced by states with which India has no diplo-
matic relations, all territorial disputes, and any case based on
facts arising before the making of the declaration in 1974.152
Such exceptions effectively nullify any acceptance of compul-
sory jurisdiction.
An analysis of the reservations under the Optional Clause
shows that only twenty-three out of the forty-seven states have
made full, significant acceptances of the Court's jurisdiction.
These acceptances may be termed "full" in the sense that they
are not immediately terminable by their own provisions nor do
they contain the types of narrowing reservations described
above. Of these twenty-three states, twelve are from the West-
ern or Developed World and eleven come from the group of
states normally considered the Third or Underdeveloped
World. 53 Of course, it must be remembered that whenever
one of these states is faced with a case brought by a state whose
declaration contains reservations, those reservations can block
the application on the basis of reciprocity. Therefore, in the
final analysis, it is only between these twenty-three nations of
the world that any form of significant jurisdiction exists for the
Court under the Optional Clause.
B. General Assembly Resolutions and the Views of States
The hesitation on the part of states to make Optional
Clause declarations and the large number of sweeping reserva-
tions are strong evidence of the real views held by states on the
usefulness of judicial settlement in international relations. 54
Other evidence as to the place of adjudication in dispute settle-
151. Id. at 70.
152. Id. at 69.
153. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Finland, Haiti, Honduras,Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Uganda, Uruguay.
154. Schwartzenberger, supra note 13, at 208.
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ment is found in the resolutions and discussions of the United
Nations General Assembly.
In 1947, the General Assembly passed a resolution asking
that the United Nations organs use the Court more often for
advisory opinions. In addition, the resolution directed the at-
tention of states to the Optional Clause and recorded "as a
general rule that states should submit their legal disputes to
the International Court ofJustice."' 155 This language was to be
by far the strongest endorsement ofjudicial settlement ever to
come from the General Assembly. In 1949, the General As-
sembly went on to update the General Act of 1928156 by chang-
ing its references to the Permanent Court into provisions re-
garding the International Court of Justice. 57 The changes
were met with a frigid response by the international commu-
nity. Only seven states have ever adhered to the revised ver-
sion of the General Act.' 58
The lack of enthusiasm on the part of states in the General
Assembly for judicial settlement reached an all-time high in the
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States (1970
Declaration).' 59 It emphasizes the right of states to choose a
suitable means of resolving disputes and provides that parties
will agree upon such peaceful means as may be appropriate to
the circumstances and the nature of the dispute. International
disputes are theoretically settled on the basis of the sovereign
equality of states and in accordance with the principle of free
choice of means. 6 ° The effort to include a reference to the
Court in the 1970 Declaration failed even though sponsors
asked only for language recommending that legal disputes be
submitted to the Court. 16 1 Opposing states felt that no refer-
155. G.A. Res. 171, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 103 (1947).
156. General Act on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Sept. 26,
1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 343.
157. Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
Apr. 28, 1949, 71 U.N.T.S. 101, fn.2.
158. Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Up-
per Volta.
159. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR (Supp. No. 28), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082
(1970).
160. Id.
161. Report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, 20 U.N. GAOR C.6 (-
th mtg) at 56, U.N. Doc. A/6230 (1966).
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ence to the Court should be made because the Charter gives
no priority to judicial settlement and because the Court had
not yet established itself as a trustworthy decision-maker. 162
During the drafting of the document, all states recognized the
importance of freedom to choose between means of dispute
settlement. It was felt that states cannot and should not try to
decide in advance which method will be used to settle their
controversies. 163
Finally in 1974, the General Assembly managed to express
a little more confidence in judicial settlement by reaffirming
that recourse to the Court should not be considered an un-
friendly act. As to the actual use of the Court, however, dele-
gates could muster only lukewarm language. Their resolution
stated only the "desirability that states study the possibility of
accepting with as few reservations as possible" the Optional
Clause.164
Perhaps no situation better underscores the hostility of
some states toward judicial settlement and the Court than that
surrounding two resolutions passed by the General Assembly
in 1970 and 1971.165 The object of these resolutions was to
persuade states to respond to a questionnaire as part of a pro-
posed review of the role of the Court. The idea of even re-
viewing the Court's role was strongly opposed by Socialist and
some Third World states.
Basically, Western countries and their allies supported the
idea. Underscoring the potential importance of the Court in
dispute settlement, Japan spoke in favor of the review. 166 Den-
mark, lamenting the exclusion of the Court from the 1970 Dec-
laration, maintained that judicial settlement was a "natural
means" of dispute resolution. 167 Belgium supported the re-
view noting that resort to judicial settlement was not inconsis-
162. Id. at 57.
163. Id. at 52.
164. G.A. Res. 3232, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 141, U.N. Doc. A/9846
(1974).
165. G.A. Res. 2723, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 128, U.N. Doc. A/8238
(1970); G.A. Res. 2818, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 137, U.N. Doc. A/8568
(1971).
166. Minutes of the Meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6
(1210th mtg) at 189, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1210 (1970). (Mr. Tsuruoka).
167. Id. (Mr. Fergo).
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tent with sovereignty. 6 ' The Netherlands focused on the role
of the Court in resolving legal disputes.' 69 France pointed out
the need for acceptance of the Optional Clause with as few res-
ervations as possible.170 Mexico, noting the need to find ways
to persuade states to make Optional Clause acceptances, also
supported the review of the Court. 17 1 India, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Australia, Norway, Madagascar, Pakistan, the Philip-
pines and the United States all spoke in favor of the review and
ways of getting states to use the Court. 72 Sweden made the
strongest argument for adjudication claiming that methods of
settlement under article 33 of the Charter are not equal, that
binding means such as arbitration and judicial settlement are
more important, and that states must accept compulsory juris-
diction as soon as possible.' 73
Of course, these statements by Western nations and their
allies must be weighed against reality. It was the West that
dominated the post-war period and the drafting of the United
Nations Charter which relegates judicial settlement to a minor
role. As noted, only nineteen Western states have made Op-
tional Clause declarations, many with substantial reservations.
The United States is a good example. Given its opposition to
compulsory adjudication in 1945, the sweeping reservations in
its Optional Clause acceptance, 74 its decision to boycott the
168. Id. at 190 (Mr. Suy).
169. Minutes of the Meetings of the Sixth Committee. 25 U.N. GAOR C. 6
(1211th mtg) at 194, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1211 (1970) (Mr. Houben).
170. Minutes of the Meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C. 6
(1212th mtg) at 199, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1212 (1970) (Mr. Deleau).
171. Minutes of the Meetings of the Sixth Committee. 25 U.N. GAOR C.
6(1215th mtg) at 213, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1215 (1970) (Mr. Vallarta).
172. Minutes of the Meetings of the Sixth Committee. 25 U.N. GAOR C. 6
(1215th mtg) at 214, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1215 (1970) (Mr.Jagota); 25 U.N. GAOR
C. 6 (1210th mtg) at 191, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1210 (1970) (Mr. Sperduti); 25 U.S.
GAOR C. 6 (1216th mtg) at 217, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1216 (1970) (Mr. Freeland);
25 U.N. GAOR C. 6 (1216th mtg) at 219, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1216 (1970) (Mr.
Brennan); 25 U.N. GAOR C. 6 (1217th mtg) at 230, U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/SR.1217
(1970) (Mr. Ofstad); 26 U.N. GAOR C. 6 (1280th mtg) at 194, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/SR.1280 (1971) (Mr. Rakotoson); 26 U.N. GAOR C. 6 (1281th mtg) at 200,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1281 (1971) (Mr. Faruki); 26 U.N. GAOR C. 6 (1281th mtg) at
201-02, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1281 (1971) (Mr. Bejasa); 25 U.N. GAOR C. 6 (1211 th
mtg) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1211 (1970) (Mr. Javits).
173. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee. 25 U.N. GAOR C.
6(1216th mtg) at 218. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1216 and Corr. I (1970)(Mr. Persson).
174. The United States Declaration under the Optional Clause (1946) contained
the following reservations:
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proceedings initiated by Nicaragua, and its termination of ac-
ceptance under the Optional Clause, the United States cannot
be considered a strong supporter of international adjudication.
As Lissitzyn has concluded, Western powers have not distin-
guished themselves by strong leadership in favor of greater use
of the Court. 175
Every Socialist country which spoke with regard to the
proposed review of the Court clearly opposed any attempt to
enhance the role of judicial settlement. The Soviet Union
maintained that the Court was an "irrelevant organ" subject to
the biased influence of "certain forces." It further noted that
any enlargement of the Court's activities or importance would
undermine the Charter, particularly if it involved compulsory
jurisdiction which could not be imposed on sovereign states.' 76
The USSR made it clear that a change in the Court's role
would require amendment of the Charter and would in no
event be tolerated. 77 Soviet leaders have generally taken a
negative attitude toward referral of disputes to adjudication
and have opposed all attempts to expand the Optional
Clause. 178
In general, the influence of the Soviet bloc has been
strongly against the extension of the judicial function in inter-
national relations. 79 The Socialist response in this case con-
tinued the trend. Poland urged that states not exaggerate the
a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals
by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded
in the future.
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the
United States of America; or
c. disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the
treaty affected by the decision are also parties before the Court, or
(2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction.
See (1983-1984) I.C.J. Yearbook 90-91 (1984).
175. 0. LISsITZYN, supra note 120.
176. 25 U.N. GAOR (193 1st plen. mtg.) Vol. III (Sept.-Dec. 1970) at 4 U.N.
Doc. A/PV.1931 (Mr. Kolesnik).
177. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C. 6
(1212th mtg) at 199, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1212(1970) (Mr. Kolesnik); 29 U.N.
GAOR C.6 (1470th mtg) at 36-37, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1470 (1974) (Mr. Fedorov).
178. 0. LISSITZYN, supra note 120, at 63. See generally Anand, Attitude of 'New'
Asian-African Countries Toward the International Court of Justice, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 383
(1961).
179. Id.
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role of the Court. 80 The Byelorussian Socialist Republic em-
phasized the incompatibility of sovereignty and judicial settle-
ment as well as the freedom of choice of means.' 8 ' Romania,
Hungary, Bulgaria, the Ukranian Socialist Republic, and Cuba
all underlined the dangers to "sovereign equality" of empow-
ering the Court with broad jurisdiction. 8 2  In particular,
Czechoslovakia noted that compulsory jurisdiction would make
the Court a supra-national organ more powerful than the Se-
curity Council. 83 Hungary, summing up the feelings of the
Socialist world, maintaiued: "[a]s long as the principle of the
sovereign equality of States applied, the Court could play only
an auxiliary role in the peaceful settlement of disputes."'
8 4
The Third World took what might be called a pragmatic
approach to the Court and judicial settlement. While Algeria
and Nigeria emphasized the need for judicial settlement, 85 Li-
beria noted that the fight over the Court and over jurisdiction
was mainly a political one: the large states, namely the United
States and the Soviet Union, had always opposed it. 186 Ethio-
pia agreed, noting that as long as the bigger powers continued
to keep their vital interests from judicial settlement, the Court
would remain a marginal institution. 87 Kenya asserted that
wide and reasonably unqualified acceptances of the Optional
Clause were in order, but the older, larger states must take the
lead in making such declarations. Kenya and a number of
180. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 26 U.N. GAOR C. 6
(1277th mtg) at 178, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1277 (1971) (Mr. Klafkowski).
181. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C. 6
(1214th mtg) at 210-211, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1214 (1970) (Mr. Shardyko).
182. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6
(1217th mtg.) at 227, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1217 (1970) (Mr. Secarin); id. at 228 (Mr.
Prandler); id. at 229 (Mr. Kostov); 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1218th mtg.) at 234, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR.1218 (1970) (Mr. Makarevich); 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1467th mtg.) at
18, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1467 (1974) (Mr. Tabio).
183. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6
(1216th mtg) at 224, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1216 (1970) (Mrs. Slamova).
184. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6
(1217th mtg) at 228, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1217 (1970) (Mr. Prandler).
185. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6
(1216th mtg.) at 223, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1216 (1970) (Mr. Boulbina and Mr.
Shitla-Bey).
186. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6
(1226th mtg.) at 273, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1226 (1970) (Mr. Brewer).
187. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 25 U.N. GAOR C.6
(1216th mtg.) at 222, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1216 (1970) (Mr. Kibret).
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other Third World states pointed out deficiencies in the Court,
such as the traditional procedure and law applied, dissatisfac-
tion with recent decisions, and the cost of litigation. These de-
ficiencies were cited as reasons for not accepting judicial settle-
ment at the present time."
In general, the Third World has shown at best a guarded
enthusiasm for judicial settlement."8 9 Only twenty-nine Third
World states have Optional Clause declarations.' 0 Moreover,
these states join all the Socialist powers and most Western
states in emphasizing both the freedom of states to choose
what means of dispute resolution should be used in a particu-
lar situation and the consensual basis of all adjudicatory juris-
diction.
C. Other Treaties and Instruments Governing Dispute Resolution
The generally negative attitude that all three blocs have
taken with regard to judicial settlement is also found in instru-
ments outside the United Nations system. In setting up vari-
ous types of relationships, states have generally avoided any
significant use ofjudicial settlement. For example, several im-
portant codification conventions' 9' contain no clause for the
use of judicial settlement in the event of disputes over legal
interpretation. Under the Geneva Conventions on the Laws of
the Sea of 1958,192 the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
lations of 19 6 1,'93 the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions of 1963,19' the Convention on Consent to Marriage of
188. See, e.g., the statements made by the Algerian and Kenyan represenatives,
25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1216th mtg.) at 222, U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/SR 1216 (1970) (Mr.
Boulbina); 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1213th mtg.) at 205, 25 U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR 1213
(1970) (Mr. Nienga).
189. 0. LIssITZYN, supra note 120, at 93.
190. See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
191. See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.311; Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, TIAS No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
192. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
193. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S.
95; id. 500 U.N.T.S. 241 (optional protocol on dispute settlement).
194. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 19863, 21 U.S.T. 77,
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1962,195 the Human Rights Convenants of 1966,196 and the
Convention on Special Missions of 1969,197 there exists noju-
risdictional grant to the Court. 98 Instead, dispute settlement
by reference to the Court is left to optional protocols.' 9 9
Similarly, while articles 66(a) and (b) of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties do allow parties to a dispute
overjus cogens 200 to submit the question to the Court, they do
so only after twelve months have passed, after the means in
United Nations Charter article 33201 have failed to resolve the
problem, and subject to the parties' power to choose arbitra-
tion.202
In the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,203 the NATO part-
ners agreed to settle disputes by peaceful means but made no
commitment to judicial settlement. Although a 1956 North At-
lantic Council resolution requires settlement by good offices
within the NATO framework before resort to any other inter-
national agency, it exempts legal disputes from this rule. They
can be directly submitted to a judicial tribunal.20 4 There is,
however, no particular tribunal endowed by the resolution
with jurisdiction for this purpose.
The 1948-1950 amendments to the General Act of 1928
reproduced in substance the original document requiring sub-
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; id., 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487 (optional
protocol on dispute settlement).
195. Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and
Registration of Marriages, Dec. 10, 1982, 521 U.N.T.S. 231.
196. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 6 I.L.M. 360; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 6 I.L.M. 368.
197. Convention on Special Missions and Optional Protocol concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 16, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 149.
198. See supra notes 191-96.
199. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205;
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
200. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N.T.S.
201. U.N, CHARTER art. 33.
202. Articles 66(a) and (b) can be found at 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969); UN
Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969).
203. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
204. See Resolution on the Peacful Settlement of Disputes and Differences Be-
tween Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 36 DEP'T ST. BULL. 17
(January 7, 1957).
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mission of disputes of all kinds of conciliation committees.2 °5
In addition, by virtue of article 17, disputes can be referred to
the International Court of Justice subject to reservations made
by states and only in the event the parties do not choose an
arbitration tribunal.20 6 Article 39 permits wide reservations to
exclude disputes concerning facts prior to a state's accession,
questions of domestic jurisdiction, and disputes in certain
types of subject matters and categories as defined by states.20 7
In the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement
of Disputes of 1957,208 states bound themselves to submit all
treaty disputes, questions of international law, and questions
of fact or reparations to the International Court of Justice.20 9
Article 3 requires that all other disputes be settled by concilia-
tion or, if that fails, by arbitration. 21 0 According to article 28,
these requirements do not apply to disputes that the parties
agree to submit to any other form of settlement. Parties are
free to choose other means as long as the disputes mentioned
in article 1 are settled by a procedure with a binding deci-
sion.21 ' Thirteen countries have signed and ratified the con-
vention.212
The Charter of the Organization of American States2 13
(O.A.S. Charter) similarly gives states free choice of means.
Article 21 lists direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, ju-
dicial settlement, conciliation, inquiry, arbitration, and any
other method the parties choose as possible means of settle-
ment.214 The Pact of Bogota (Pact)2t5 is part of the O.A.S.
Charter by virtue of article 26.216 In the Pact, parties agree to
205. Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
Apr. 28, 1949, 71 U.N.T.S. 101.
206. Id. art. 17.
207. Id. art. 39.
208. Apr. 29, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 243.
209. Id. art. 1.
210. Id. art. 4.
211. Id. art. 28.
212. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, GFR, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 2 P. ROHN, WORLD
TREATY INDEX 875 (1983).
213. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
214. Id. art. 21.
215. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55.
216. Id. art. 26.
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use peaceful means to settle their differences before going to
the United Nations Security Council.21 7 The Pact specifies
good offices and mediation, 21 8 inquiry and conciliation, 2 "judi-
cial settlement,220 and arbitration. 22 ' Article 3 gives states the
ability to choose between these methods.22 2 Recourse to the
International Court of Justice under chapter 4 is based on the
Optional Clause declarations of the states (the Pact itself does
not create an independent base of jurisdiction) and is only
available in the event there has been no agreement to arbitrate
and no solution has been found through conciliation.223
By contrast, there is no mention whatsover of judicial set-
tlement or the Court in the Charter of the Organization of Af-
rican Unity. 224 Under article 19, all members commit them-
selves to the peaceful settlement of disputes and to the estab-
lishment of a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and
Arbitration. 221 A protocol enacted to bring this Commission
to life provides procedures for mediation, conciliation, and ar-
bitration. 26 Article 19 of the protocol guarantees states the
right to choose the means of dispute settlement they prefer.227
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
of 1966228 established an International Centre for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes. The Centre is designed to oper-
ate through the written consent of the parties involved and on
the basis of conciliation or arbitration. 229 There is no provi-
sion for judicial settlement.
Creating the exception to the non-use of judicial settle-
ment, the Europeans have taken the unique step of forming
specialized courts with limited jurisdiction in various contexts.
217. Id. arts. 1-2.
218. Id. ch. 2.
219. Id. ch. 3.
220. Id. ch. 4.
221. Id. ch. 5.
222. Id. art. 3.
223. Id. art. 32.
224. 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963).
225. Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, 3
I.L.M. 1116 (1964).
226. Id.
227. Id. art. 19.
228. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Mar. 18, 1965, 575
U.N.T.S. 159, art. 1.
229. Id. art, 28.
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For instance, the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 2 0 created the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights. However, it left to states the
ultimate decision as to whether or not to accept the compe-
tence of the Court.23 States are permitted to accept only on
the basis of reciprocity should they so desire.23 2 A similar but
more binding arrangement was used in creating the European
Court ofJustice. It has been charged with compulsory jurisdic-
tion over questions under the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity Treaty, the Euratom Pact, and the European Economic
Community Treaty.2 3
This use ofjudicial settlement by the Europeans is the ex-
ception, not the rule. Their use of adjudication can be attrib-
uted to their common cultural backgrounds and, more impor-
tantly, to their need for authoritative interpretation of impor-
tant economic instruments. The European Community is a
fact of life which touches millions of European citizens and
businesses every day. Questions cannot go without resolution.
Compulsory jurisdiction and judicial settlement ensure that
questions of Community law do not go unanswered and that
economic instruments can be interpreted on the basis of a
stream of consistent jurisprudence. In addition, it must be
remembered that the European Court of Justice is not just a
smaller version of the International Court of Justice. Its juris-
diction is strictly limited to matters arising under the treaties
establishing the various European Communities.234 Moreover,
although cases are often as highly political and emotional as
one can imagine, states rarely bring actions against one an-
other.
Even in the European context, judicial settlement has lim-
its. The European Court of Justice is undoubtedly highly
respected in its interpretation of the Community's economic
instruments. However, the European Court of Justice was not
consulted in 1966 when France decided to abstain from further
230. Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
dom, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 19.
231. Id. art. 46(1).
232. Id. art. 46(2).
233. See Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European
Communities, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.1 (5179-11), 289 U.N.T.S. 269.
234. See, e.g., infra note 235.
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participation in the European Economic Community due to a
dispute over voting. The procedure for voting on the financ-
ing of the Community's massive Common Agricultural Policy
was scheduled to change in that year from a unanimity to a
majoritarian system. France, fearing adverse changes in the
policy, argued that unanimity should be preserved and boy-
cotted its Community obligations creating perhaps the most
serious crisis in the Community's history. Although France
was, at the very least, arguably in violation of her obligations
under the Treaty of Rome, no other member state challenged
her in the European Court ofJustice. Instead, recognizing the
vital interests involved, the Europeans set about finding a reso-
lution to the crisis through political negotiations which ulti-
mately resulted in the Luxembourg Accords. 235
In 1979, the Andean Pact nations adopted the European
Community approach and signed a treaty establishing a Court
ofJustice to settle their differences.23 6 The Court is one of the
principal institutions of the Cartagena Economic Agreement.
The jurisdiction of the Court is therefore limited to challeng-
ing actions of the executive authority of the Cartagena commu-
nity and the non-compliance of member states.237 Article 1
makes it clear that the Court does not have competence to rule
on questions outside the Cartagena framework.238
Finally, in the Law of the Sea Convention, 239 states ex-
pressed what was perhaps the greatest unity of opinion on ju-
dicial settlement in history. All states, even the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, agreed that the compulsory jurisdiction
of an international tribunal was necessary.240 Consequently,
article 286 of the Convention reads:
235. For a description of the French objection and the Luxembourg Accords,
see P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMMAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1973); D. LASOK &J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1982).
236. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, 18
I.L.M. 1203 (1979), art. 6.
237. Id. art. 17-27.
238. Id. art. 1.
239. United Nations Convention On the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Convention on the Law of the Sea].
240. Jaenicke, Dispute Settlement Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 43 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 813, 815
(1983).
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Subject to section 3, any dispute concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of this Convention shall, where no settle-
ment has been reached by reference to section 1, be submit-
ted at the request of any party to the dispute to the court or
tribunal having jurisdiction under this section. 24 1
As the wording of article 286 suggests, however, there was
a price for the agreement on compulsory jurisdiction.242 Sec-
tion 3, to which the use of judicial settlement is subject, auto-
matically excludes from jurisdiction any dispute relating to the
exercise of "sovereign rights" by a coastal state within its mari-
time zone.2 43 Moreover, it provides that states may, at their
option, exclude from adjudication military activities at sea and
law enforcement within the coastal zone 24 4 as well as disputes
over the delineation of boundaries. 245  This last subject,
boundary disputes, was considered particularly appropriate for
judicial procedures. However, so many states felt that judicial
settlement would infringe on sovereignty in this area that the
possibility for reservations was created in order to secure
agreement.246
Another concession made in order to get agreement on
judicial settlement was flexibility in the choice of tribunal.
States can choose to submit differences to the International
Court ofJustice, the Law of the Sea Tribunal, or an ad hoc arbi-
tration.247 Without such flexibility, adjudication would play a
much smaller role in the Convention than it now does.2 4 8 In
any case, the recourse to judicial settlement under article 286
is limited by the parties' power in section 1 of the chapter on
dispute settlement to choose any other means of settlement
they desire, including direct negotiations and conciliation.249
241. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 239, art. 286.
242. Id.
243. Id. art. 297.
244. Id. art. 297(1).
245. Id. art. 298(a).
246. Janeicke, supra note 240, at 819.
247. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 239, art. 287(1).
248. Janeicke, supra note 240, at 823.
249. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 239, art. 286.
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IV. EXPLAINING HOSTILITY TOWARD JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT
Any number of reasons can be advanced to explain the
hostility of states toward international adjudication. States
themselves have not hesitated to explain their dislike. The
Socialist states have been clear in their position that judicial
settlement on a compulsory basis is incompatible with sover-
eignty. The idea is that if and when a court can force states to
present their disputes, the right of choice in foreign affairs will
be non-existent and sovereignty thus violated. The Soviet
Union's stand against judicial settlement is thus based on the
principle of equality of sovereigns. 25" The United Nations is a
voluntary organization. If it were compulsory, it would have
the characteristics of a supra-national body and would rob its
members of their sovereignty. 25' The same is said to be true of
the compulsory settlement of disputes by a court.252
The opposition of the Third World is less theoretical.
Although Northrop explains the Third World reluctance on
the basis of its cultural and religious differences with the West-
ern world,253 Sohn, Stone, and Anand have shown that the real
reasons lie elsewhere.254 The Third World's heavy reliance as
debtor upon the West, 2 55 the remoteness of the Court and lack
256 thof international law expertise, and the fear of losing cases on
political grounds 257 better account for the Third World's re-
luctance to dive headlong into judicial settlement. For these
countries, the law with regard to important issues such as na-
tionalization, sea bed use, and collective defense is still in a
developing stage. 258 Therefore, there are not adequate rules
250. I. LAPENNA, CONCEPTIONS SOVIETIQUES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
293 (1954).
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
253. NORTHROP, TAMING OF NATIONS 80-81 (1952).
254. Stone, A Common Law for Mankind, 1 INT'L LEGAL STUD. 430, 431 (1959-60);
Sohn, Proposals for the Establishment of a system of International Tribunals, TRADE ARBITRA-
TION 64 (1958); Anand, The Role of the 'New'Asian-African Countries in the Present Legal
Order, 50 AM.J. INT'L L. 383 (1961).
255. Stone, supra note 254, at 430.
256. Sohn, supra note 254, at 64.
257. Anand, supra note 254, at 404.
258. See P. BUIRETTE-MAURAU, LA PARTICIPATION DU TIERS-MONDE k L'ELAB-
ORATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1983) (discussion of the Third World's views with
respect to these and other legal issues).
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for an international judiciary to apply in cases involving issues
vital to these nations. The statements made by Third World
representatives in the United Nations support the above expla-
nation of the Third World attitude toward adjudication.259
The real problem underlying Western reluctance to accept
compulsory jurisdiction is simply the lack of political will to
submit their disputes to a court. 260 This attitude is evidenced
by the reservations attached to Optional Clause acceptances,
the attitude of non-appearing respondents-including recently
the United States-and the structure of international organiza-
tions. It is not impossible for states to use judicial settlement
effectively. Where the West has chosen to use it, judicial set-
tlement has functioned reasonably well. For example, there is
unanimity of opinion that the common social milieu and the
need for final decisions in the European Community has in-
creased the political will to use, and consequently the effective-
ness of, judicial settlement.2 61 Where the desire to create and
use appropriate judicial structures exists, adjudication can be-
come an important dispute mechanism.
A number of things work against the development of
Western political will with regard to judicial settlement. As
early as 1907, Root noted that those entrusted with being
judges of an international judiciary often act more like diplo-
matic agents than neutral decisionmakers.26 2 Brownlie has
cited the political facts that recourse to a court is often consid-
ered an unfriendly act, that judges are distrusted, and that
states prefer to keep their dispute settlement options open.
263
259. The representative of Ethiopia cited changes in the world community and
balance of power, the need for new international legal norms, and the pro-Western
orientation of the Court's judges. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee,
26 U.N. GAOR (6th C.) at 173, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1277 (1971) (Mr. Woldeg Gi-
orges); Uruguay similarly focused on the distrust of the Third World with regard to
international legal norms and the wide divergence of opinion as to content of the
norms themselves. Minutes of the meetings of the Sixth Committee, 26 U.N. GAOR
(6th C.) at 179, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1278 (1971) (Mr. Gonzalez Laperpe).
260. The very same point was made by the French delegate to the Sixth Com-
mittee. Id. (Mr. Deleau).
261. Tomuschat, supra note 53, at 397; Golson, Report in JUDICIAL SETrLEMENT:
AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 115-117 (1974); C. DE VISSCHER, ASPECTS RECENT DU
DROIT PROCEDURAL DE LA COUR INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE 178 (1966).
262. See 0. LissrrzYN, supra note 120, at 41 (discussion on Root's communica-
tions to the United States Delegation).
263. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL L.Aw 731 (3d ed. 1979).
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Fitzmaurice emphasized the fear of losing a case as well as the
loss of tools like propaganda, bargaining, lobbying, and ma-
nipulation of votes.2 6 4 He also noted a general lack of confi-
dence in the International Court of Justice as an institution ac-
tually capable of settling disputes.265 Apart from their official
statements to the contrary, Socialist states probably object to
adjudication and compulsory jurisdiction for these very same
reasons. In the end, it is undoubtedly a combination of these
factors which, when weighed against other forms of dispute
settlement, inclines states to stay away from judicial resolution.
Responding to the hostility and doubts of the world's
three blocs of nations, the United Nations Charter and other
international instruments make judicial settlement but one of
many methods of dispute resolution open to states. The free
choice of means is emphasized. Where recourse to a court is
possible, it is limited both in terms of subject matter and con-
ditions prerequisite to its use, i.e. diplomatic negotiations and
reservations to adjudication. Often, no tribunal is endowed
with jurisdiction where the treaty or convention calls for judi-
cial settlement. Of course, these instruments did not appear
like Moses and the Ten Commandments from Mount Sinai.
Instead, they are the product of the will of governments, and
as such, they are the strongest evidence available for the aver-
sion of states to judicial settlement.
V. THE PROSPECTS FOR JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
Judicial settlement is and will probably remain a secondary
method of international dispute resolution. The prevailing at-
titude among states shows that acceptance of compulsory juris-
diction in the near future is highly unlikely. The very structure
of the Court's Statute and its Optional Clause provide testi-
mony of the inherent weaknesses of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction. States can and do ignore the Court. Acceptances
ofjurisdiction that are made can and do possess any number of
crippling reservations and conditions. Moreover, as the phe-
nomenon of the non-appearing respondents shows, states feel
264. Fitzmaurice, Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court in 2 FUTURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 463 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
265. Id. at 465-67.
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free in certain circumstances to disregard the obligations they
have made with regard to mandatory judicial settlement.
Even more fundamentally, there exists no significant obli-
gation requiring states to resolve disputes through judicial
means. The tradition of creating international instruments
which feature other methods of dispute resolution continues.
The United Nations system is based upon the ultimate political
resolution of disputes by the Security Council. In most other
relationships, states have chosen to feature conciliation, nego-
tiation, and arbitration over judicial processes. The emphasis
in almost all systems is on the freedom of states to choose the
appropriate means of dispute settlement. Thus, even the first
steps toward establishing a court as a key dispute mechanism
have not been taken. There is, therefore, little tradition of se-
rious, mandatory use of judicial settlement to build on in per-
suading states to accept reform of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
At best, only a handful of states show a tendency to accept
a compulsory form of international adjudication. Their sup-
port for adjudication can only be termed a "tendency" because
none of these states has actually been called before the Court
in a dispute. 266 The rest of the world, including the United
States, most major Western nations, the Soviet Union, and the
Eastern Bloc, confirms the secondary importance of judicial
settlement by its reluctance to use the International Court of
Justice. In addition, states clearly reject any form of compul-
sory jurisdiction by their votes in the General Assembly, by the
views they publicly express with regard to adjudication, and by
the quantity and quality of declarations they make under the
Optional Clause. This opposition is so pervasive that it would
be unrealistic to expect judicial settlement to soon become a
serious factor in resolving international controversies.
Given the very clear and limited role that states created for
judicial settlement in the United Nations Charter, a serious at-
tempt to expand the International Court of Justice's jurisdic-
tion would inevitably involve an amendment of the Charter it-
266. This "handful" of countries is composed of states with significant, broad
declarations under the Optional Clause. See supra note 153. None of these nations
has been called before the Court as a respondent on the basis of their declarations. It
is, therefore, impossible to tell how seriously even they would take their Optional
Clause obligations if important interests were involved.
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self. In light of the hostility that all but a few states have shown
with regard to compulsory adjudication, such an effort would
be doomed to failure. Perhaps then, it is time for the world to
look to other methods of dispute resolution. The time for the
compulsory resolution of disputes by an international judiciary
has not yet come.
